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Abstract
Vaccination is crucial for the control of epidemics. Yet it is a social dilemma since
non-vaccinators can benefit from the herd immunity created by the vaccinators.
Thus the optimum vaccination level is not reached via voluntary vaccination at
times. Intensive studies incorporate social networks to study vaccination be-
havior, and it is shown that vaccination can be promoted on some networks.
The underlying network, however, is often assumed to be static, neglecting the
dynamical nature of social networks. We investigate the vaccination behavior
on dynamical social networks using both simulations and mean-field approxi-
mations. We find that the more robust the vaccinator-infected-non-vaccinator
links are or the more fragile the vaccinator-healthy-non-vaccinator links are, the
higher the final vaccination level is. This result is true for arbitrary rationality.
Furthermore, we show that, under strong selection, the vaccination level can
be higher than that in the well-mixed population. In addition, we show that
vaccination on evolving social network is equivalent to the vaccination in well
mixed population with a rescaled basic reproductive ratio. Our results highlight
the dynamical nature of social network on the vaccination behavior, and can be
insightful for the epidemic control.
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1. Introduction
The control of influenza has been important for human beings. Vaccination
has been the principal strategy for the control of infectious diseases since [1, 2]
it’s invented. It takes time and money for vaccinators to take vaccination.
Vaccinators are free from disease with a large likelyhood. For simplicity, we
assume that the vaccination is perfect, i.e., whoever takes the vaccination would
be free from disease [3, 4]. Yet side effects would also occur from time to time
including fever. When the vaccination level is sufficiently high, the unvaccinated
individuals benefit from the herd immunity created by vaccinated individuals.
Consequently the unvaccinated are not likely to get infected. In other words,
herd immunity is similar to the ’public goods’ in the tragedy of commons [5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10], where public goods are collected from those who contribute. It
naturally results in a social dilemma between vaccinators and unvaccinators.
Therefore, vaccination is a social dilemma [5, 8, 4, 11]. Vaccinated individ-
uals remain healthy. For unvaccinated individuals, there are two cases: some
of them benefit from herd immunity and remain healthy without paying any-
thing, i.e., successful hitchhikers; the rest get infected and bear a treatment
cost. Therefore, self-interested individuals try to avoid vaccination and benefit
from herd immunity. Such hitchhiking leads to a low vaccination level, which
can be lower than the optimum vaccination level required for the population.
Consequently, it leads to a failure to eradicate the disease. Evolutionary game
theory has been widely adopted in the study of vaccination, because individuals’
welfare in the vaccination is not only up to their decisions to take vaccination
but also is determined by others’ decisions to take vaccination [3, 4, 12, 13, 14].
There are two stages in the vaccination. One is vaccination campaign and
the other is epidemic spreading. Vaccination campaign typically occurs before
epidemic outbreak. At this time, it is typically assume that individuals vac-
cinate voluntarily. In other words, individuals adjust their decisions to take
vaccination or not. The unvaccinated individuals are likely to get infected if
they interact most often with other unvaccinated individuals. Vaccinators are
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free from disease. When the epidemic season comes, disease spreads via con-
tacts. There are many models of disease transmission, such as SIS [15], SIR
[8, 4, 16], SEIR [17], SEIQR [18], SAIS model [19] and so on.
When the epidemic season is over, individuals try to adjust their decisions
to vaccinate or not. Typically imitation rule is adopted: individuals compare
their own payoffs with the others to determine whether to vaccinate for the next
outbreak of influenza. Influenza viruses mutate so often that every year the in-
fluenza needs an alternative vaccine. Therefore, we also assume that no one is
immune to the mutated virus unless it takes new vaccine. Previous works study
vaccination campaign on a static population structure, such as scale-free net-
work, random graph network, square lattice and so on [8, 4, 20, 21, 22, 15, 23].
It is found that the hub nodes in static network are likely to take vaccination,
which it is crucial to inhibit the outbreak of epidemic on a degree heterogenous
network [15]. This is because the more neighbors there are, the higher the in-
fection possibility is. At the same time, hub nodes’ vaccination is beneficial to
the improvement of the herd immunity for their neighbors. It highlights the
importance of vaccination when heterogenous network structure is taken into
account to model epidemic spreading. In addition, it also suggests that it can
be effective to control epidemics via deactivating links in a static network [23].
However, social relationships among individuals varies from time to time. It is
shown that the epidemics could be controlled via social adjustments [24]. This
intrinsic nature of social network has been neglected in modelling vaccination, to
the best of our knowledge. On the other hand, interestingly, dynamical networks
have been intensively studied in the field of epidemic spreading and coopera-
tion, respectively. In epidemic spreading, susceptible individuals are likely to
stay away from the infected. In cooperative social dilemmas, cooperators are
prone to connect with other cooperators to get rid of the exploitation by de-
fectors. Similarly, unvaccinated individuals tend to keep away from those who
are unvaccinated, and try to connect with vaccinators to be protected from the
herd immunity. In other words, herein unvaccinators try to connect more often
with the vaccinated. We explicitly model the dynamical nature of the social
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network. And we study the vaccination campaign on a stochastic dynamical
network, where the individuals adjust not only their strategies to vaccinate or
not to but also their social relationships [25, 26, 27, 28].
2. Model
We assume that the model consists of two stages [4, 29, 16, 30]: epidemic
spreading and vaccination campaign which includes social relationship adjust-
ments and strategy updates (see Fig. (1)). The first stage: epidemic spreads
after everybody decides whether to vaccinate or not to according to the last sea-
son’s vaccination campaign. Then non-vaccinator will get infected with a certain
probability. The second stage: When the disease stops spreading, individuals
adjust their social relationship and update their strategies simultaneously, de-
pending on social bias and the difference in payoff between them and others
[24].
Figure 1: Two-stage model. The evolutionary process consists of two stages: epidemic
spreading and vaccination campaign. In the first stage, the population of fraction x have been
vaccinated. Then the disease spreads based on the SIR model. In the second stage, When
the disease stops spreading, individuals perform social relationship adjustments and update
strategies. Social link adjustment is incorporated in the vaccination campaign stage, whereas
previous studies concentrate on the strategy updates only in the second stage.
The non-vaccinators are likely to be infected with a certain probability, not
only by their neighbors, but also by the people with whom they contact on the
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road. Thus we assume that the epidemic spreads in a well mixed population
[31, 32], where every individual interacts with all the rest individuals with equal
probability. For social relationship adjustments and strategy updates, individ-
uals are mainly affected by thy neighbors. So we assume the social relationship
adjustments and strategy updates occur on the network [8, 24], which is about
to vary from time to time.
Every vaccinated individual takes a cost V > 0. This cost V refers to the
time and money spent on taking vaccination and its potential side effects such as
fever. We assume that the vaccination is perfect, i.e., whoever takes the vacci-
nation would be free from disease [3, 4]. For the unvaccinated individuals, some
are healthy that pay neither the cost of vaccination nor the cost of treatment. In
other words, they are of payoff 0. The others are infected with cost C > 0. This
cost C includes time and expenses for treatment. Without loss of generality, we
assume that C > V > 0. However, individual’s perceived payoff can be different
from their actual payoff, due to underestimating or overestimating the risk of
disease [33, 11]. In order to simplify the model, we take no account of the gap
between perceived and actual payoff, and assume that individuals are of perfect
recognition.
Vaccination is typically not available any more provided the vaccination
campaign is over. The unvaccinated individuals can be infected when they are
surrounded by infected individuals. We denote the vaccine uptake level by x,
and probability of getting infected by f(x). In general, f(x) is determined by
the underlying epidemic dynamics.
2.1. Epidemic spreading in a well mixed population
Here we use a simple Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model to capture
the dynamics of epidemic spreading. We have assumed that all individuals are
well mixed during the disease spreading. Susceptible individuals catch infection
with rate α if they contact with another infected individual; the infected recover
with a rate γ [3]. Noteworthy, individuals do not get infected as long as they
get vaccinated, since we assume that the effectiveness of vaccination is 100%.
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In particular, the SIR model results in an infection probability (see Appendix
A)
f(x) =
1−
1
R0(1−x) if 0 ≤ x < 1− 1R0
0 if x ≥ 1− 1R0
, (1)
where R0 = α/(γ + µ) is the basic reproductive ratio [3, 34].
2.2. Campaign: social relationship adjustments and strategy updates
When diseases stops spreading, there comes the vaccination campaign of the
next year. Herein individuals either adjust their social ties (with probability ω)
or adjust their strategies. We assume a network model, where nodes represent
individuals and links refer to the social ties between individuals.
2.2.1. Social relationship adjustments
In the stage of vaccination campaign, in contrast with previous models, we
assume that network is evolving across time. This dynamical network arises
from social bias [24]. For example: i) every vaccinator has a high probability of
continuing to vaccinate for the next influenza season; ii) non-vaccinators would
like to attach to vaccinators to acquire benefits from potential herd immunity
in the next influenza season; iii) infected non-vaccinators are more likely to be
excluded than others. Typically, during the vaccination compaign, individuals
make up their decisions to vaccinate or not to only once, whereas they could
adjust their social ties many times. Therefore, we assume that strategy updates
occur rarely compared to link rewirings.
Here we denote the Vaccinated by Strategy V , the Unvaccinated & Healthy
by Strategy UH, the Unvaccinated & Infected by Strategy UI. There are three
types of individuals, hence a link ij can be one of the six types (V V,UHUH,UIUI, V UH, V UI, UHUI).
We assume that each link breaks with probability kij (i.e., probability of link
breaking between an individual taking strategy i and an individual taking strat-
egy j).
Each time, a link ij, whose two ending nodes are individuals taking strategy i
and j, is selected. It breaks with probability kij . If the link is broken, individual
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taking strategy i or individual taking strategy j will be entitled to establish a
new link with others except his or her current neighbors (see Fig. (2) for details).
The model captures the dynamical nature of the social network with the
number of links constant over time. Noteworthy, social tie adjustments do not
happen in the epidemic spreading season. It does not refer to the fact that
susceptible individuals try to break ties with infected neighbors to escape from
being infected. Herein social ties are evolving motivated by social bias [24].
Unvaccinated & Healthy
Vaccinated
Unvaccinated & Infected
D
A I
H
J
C
E
G
F
B
Figure 2: The adjustment of social relationships. When the dashed link is selected
during the link adjustments, it breaks with probability kV UI . If the link is broken, individual
A taking strategy V or individual B taking strategy UI will be selected randomly. The
selected individual then establishes a new link. For example, if individual A is selected, it will
randomly switch to a neighbor who is not his or her current neighbors (B, D, E, F, G, H, I,
J). If individual B is selected, it will also randomly switch to a neighbor who is not his or her
current neighbors (A, C, D, E, F, G, J).
7
2.2.2. Strategy updates
For strategy updates, we adopt the imitation rule. Here, imitation happens
via the current network. Individuals with high payoff are more likely to be
followed in strategy [35]. Specifically, we use the Fermi update rule when indi-
vidual imitates others [36, 37]: i) A link, namely ij, is selected at random; ii)
If the node named individual i at the extremes of the link is selected randomly;
iii) The individual i imitates the strategy of the individual at the other side of
the selected link, i.e., j, with probability:
1
1 + exp [−β (fj − fi)] , (2)
where fi and fj are the accumulated payoffs of player i and j. And β ≥ 0
is the selection intensity [38]. The selection intensity indicates how strongly
individuals react to payoff gap. For example, if β is large, when fj − fi > 0, a
small gap between fi and fj will lead to individual i to imitate the strategy of
individual j with a great probability. If β is small, i.e., β is close to zero, the
probability is close to one half, provided the difference between fi and fj is not
too large. In other words, individual i will imitate the strategy of individual j
randomly in this case. Thus the selection intensity also mirrors the rationality
of individuals in the population.
3. Analysis and results
It is challenging to analytically address the vaccination behavior on dynam-
ical networks. One of the reasons is that it is not easy to analytically capture
the dynamics of networks, on which imitation takes place. In this section, we
make use of the Markov Chain to capture the linking dynamics. The stationary
regime of the linking dynamics can be analytically approximated. This results
in an mean-field equation of the vaccination level with linking dynamics. The
equation facilitates us to investigate how the link rewiring process alters the
evolution of vaccination level, as well as how selection intensity (or rationality)
alters the vaccination behavior.
8
3.1. Vaccination dilemma
As mentioned before, we assume that the population structure is well mixed
when the disease spreads. Naturally, population are divided into three groups.
One is those who takes vaccination. Because the vaccination is of 100% effective,
these individuals are healthy yet they bear a cost of vaccination V > 0. These
individuals are of fraction x. For those who do not take vaccination, there are
two cases: one is those who are healthy without any cost. These unvaccinators
benefit from the herd immunity, so they pay nothing. The other is those who
are infected. They bear a cost of infection, including treatment time, expenses
and etc, denoted by C > 0. An unvaccinated individual gets infected with
probability f(x) and the fraction of the unvaccinated individuals is 1−x. Hence
unvaccinated but healthy individuals is of fraction (1− x)(1− f(x)), with cost
0. Unvaccinated and infected individuals is of fraction (1 − x)f(x), with cost
C > 0 to recover.
We have denoted the Vaccinated by Strategy V , the Unvaccinated & Healthy
by UH, the Unvaccinated & Infected by UI. To make it clear, we give the
fraction and payoff of the three types of individuals in Table. (1)
Vaccinated Unvaccinated & Healthy Unvaccinated & Infected
Notation V UH UI
Fraction x (1− x)(1− f(x)) (1− x)f(x)
Payoff −V 0 −C
Table 1: The fraction and payoff of all the three types of individuals.
3.2. Strategy updates with linking dynamics: a mean-field analysis
When the epidemic season is over, individuals adjust their neighbors moti-
vated by social bias. When the linking dynamics is much faster than that of
the strategy updates, i.e., ω is approaching 1, the network topology has already
reached its stationary regime as strategy updates take place [8, 4, 24, 25].
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For link rewiring process, the status of a link can be modelled as a ran-
dom walk in the status space of {V V,UHUH,UIUI, V UH, V UI, UHUI}, i.e.,
a Markov Chain (see Appendix B). The Markov Chain is aperiodic and irre-
ducible, and thus there exists a unique stationary distribution for each link, The
stationary distribution is given by
piij =
a(x)(2− δij)xixj
kij
, (3)
where i, j ∈ {V,UI, V H}, δij indicates the Kronecker Delta, and a(x) is the
normalization factor [25]. Noteworthy, piij represents the fraction of ij links in
the network when the topology reaches its stationary regime.
For the evolution of the vaccination level x, there are four cases: i) the
vaccinated individuals imitate the unvaccinated and healthy individuals; ii) the
unvaccinated and healthy individuals imitate the vaccinated individuals; iii) the
vaccinated individuals imitate the unvaccinated and infected individuals; iv) the
unvaccinated and infected individuals imitate the vaccinated individuals. Tak-
ing the first case as an example, a V UH link is selected with probability piV UH .
Then the vaccinated individual is selected with probability one half, this is be-
cause individual between the two nodes at the extremes of the link is selected
randomly. And the vaccination individual imitates the strategy of the unvacci-
nated and healthy individual with probability [1 + exp (β (fV − fUH))]−1. Sim-
ilarly, the other three cases are known. Thus, the dynamics of the vaccination
behavior is given by
x˙ =− piV UH 1
2
1
1 + exp [β (fV − fUH)]
+ piV UH
1
2
1
1 + exp [β (fUH − fV )]
− piV UI 1
2
1
1 + exp [β (fV − fUI)]
+ piV UI
1
2
1
1 + exp [β (fUI − fV )] .
(4)
We substitute Eqs. (1)(2)(3) and Table. (1) into Eq. (4). It gives rise to an
equation
x˙ = a(x)x (1− x)
[(
1
kV UI
tanh
β (C − V )
2
+
1
kV UH
tanh
βV
2
)
f (x)− 1
kV UH
tanh
βV
2
]
.
(5)
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Because a(x) is positive and does not affect the equilibrium point and its
stability, we get a simplified form of Eq. (5) by a time rescaling,
x˙ = x (1− x)
[(
1
kV UI
tanh
β (C − V )
2
+
1
kV UH
tanh
βV
2
)
f (x)− 1
kV UH
tanh
βV
2
]
. (6)
We are concentrating the limit behavior of the vaccination level, thus all the
analysis are performed based on Eq. (6).
By setting Eq. (6)=0, we find that there are two trivial fixed points 0 and
1, respectively. Furthermore, if
R0 > 1 +
kV UI
kV UH
tanh βV2
tanh β(C−V )2
, (7)
there exists an internal equilibrium x∗ ∈ (0, 1), which is given by
x∗ = 1− 1
R0
(
1 +
kV UI
kV UH
tanh βV2
tanh β(C−V )2
)
. (8)
Let G(x) =
(
1
kV UI
tanh β(C−V )2 +
1
kV UH
tanh βV2
)
f (x) − 1
kV UH
tanh βV2 ,
we rewrite Eq. (6) as x˙ = x (1− x)G(x). Since f(x) is a decreasing function,
G(x) is also a decreasing function. If Eq. (7) is satisfied, G(x∗) is always zero
and G(0) is always positive. That is to say, x˙ > 0 when x < x∗, and x˙ < 0
when x > x∗. So when Eq. (7) is satisfied, x∗ is an internal stable equilibrium.
If Eq. 7 does not hold, there is no internal equilibrium with x∗ = 0 the only
stable equilibrium.
By analyzing the internal equilibrium x∗, we get a main result: if there is
an internal equilibrium, then it has to be stable.
3.3. Social bias and rationality
Based on Eq. ((8)), we observe that the final vaccination level is determined
by the social bias, i.e., the linking dynamics, kV UIkV UH and the rationality β, besides
the payoff entries of the vaccination C and V . We try to figure out i) how the
social bias, i.e. linking dynamics, alters the vaccination level; and ii) how the
rationality alters the vaccination level. All the analysis are performed for a
sufficient large basic reproductive ratio determined by Eq. (7).
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3.3.1. Social bias
From Eq. (8), we get that x∗ is an increasing function of kV UH , but a
decreasing function of kV UI . We show this in Fig. (4). Intuitively, from the
stationary distribution for each link Eq. (2), piij is a decreasing function of
kij . In other words, the smaller the kij is, the more ij links there are. Or the
stronger ij ties are, the larger the number of ij links is. If kV UH is small, the
piV UH is large, i.e., the number of unvaccinated and healthy individuals around
the vaccinator increases. This has been shown on the left hand side of Fig. (3).
When strategy updates, the probability becomes larger that vaccinators select
an unvaccinated and healthy individual to imitate. In addition, the payoff of
unvaccinated and healthy individual is larger than vaccinated individual, so the
probability with which vaccinator imitates the strategy of unvaccinated and
healthy individual becomes even larger. Consequently fewer individuals get
vaccinated.
If kV UI is small, piV UI is large, i.e., the number of infected unvaccinators
around the vaccinator increases, shown on the right hand side of Fig. (3). At
the same time, infected individuals are isolated from the other unvaccinated via
the vaccinated individual. When strategy updates, the likelyhood that infected
non-vaccinators select a vaccinated individual becomes larger. Infected unvac-
cinators are more likely to imitate the strategy of vaccinators, since the payoff
of infected unvaccinator is smaller than that of the vaccinators’. Then more
people will take vaccination.
3.3.2. Rationality
Noteworthy, Eq. (8) captures the evolution of vaccination behavior on a
complex dynamical network for any selection intensity. Taking the internal
equilibrium x∗ as a function of selection intensity, we get
dx∗
dβ
= − kV UI
kV UH
1
R0
 V2 sech 2 (V2 β) tanh
(
C−V
2 β
)
− C−V2 tanh
(
V
2 β
)
sech 2
(
C−V
2 β
)
tanh2
(
C−V
2 β
)
 . (9)
When the ratio of C to V exceeds 2, dx
∗
dβ is always negative. Hence, x
∗ is a
decreasing function of β. In other words, if C > 2V , the stronger the reaction
of individuals to the payoff gap is, i.e., the stronger the selection intensity is,
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Unvaccinated & Healthy
Vaccinated
Unvaccinated & Infected
Figure 3: Illustration of the network configuration driven by linking dynam-
ics. kV UI
kV UH
is the breaking probability ratio between vaccinated-infected-unvaccinator and
vaccinated-healthy-unvaccinator links. The smaller the ratio kV UI
kV UH
is, the more likely a vac-
cinator meets an infected unvaccinator than meets a healthy unvaccinator. The left panel
shows a local network configuration of large kV UI
kV UH
, whereas the right panel indicates that of
a small kV UI
kV UH
. The local network configuration similar to the right panel is key for a high
vaccination level.
the less people get vaccinated when the disease breaks out. When the ratio of
C to V is below 2, the derivative of the equilibrium, i.e., dx
∗
dβ , is always positive.
Hence, x∗ is an increasing function of β. In other words, if C < 2V , the stronger
the reaction of individuals to the payoff gap is, the more people get vaccinated
when the disease breaks out. (see Appendix C for more details)
It has been suggested that weak selection promotes the spread of altruism
and strong selection impedes altruism [39]. When the ratio of C to V is beyond 2
and the selection intensity is weak, i.e., the medical cost is high, people are more
likely to take vaccination to avoid the expensive medical cost, which improves
the herd immunity and protects the unvaccinated connected to them at the
same time. Here, vaccination can be seen an altruism behavior, because society
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benefits from herd immunity which is contributed by vaccinated individuals
[5, 40, 41]. When the selection intensity is strong, people are sensitive to the
payoff gap. At the same time, the fraction of people around them getting
vaccinated is large, which leads to a high herd immunity. The probability of
successful hitchhiking without paying anything is high [5, 6, 7], so individuals
prefer not to vaccinate and try to benefit from herd immunity to keep healthy.
When the ratio of C to V is below 2, i.e., the medical cost is low. People
are more likely not to vaccinate to stay away from the side effects of the vaccine
when the selection intensity is weak. When the selection intensity is strong,
they find it is better to get vaccinated. Because the herd immunity is low,
which makes it easily get infected [5, 6, 7]. Since the medical cost C is always
larger than the vaccination cost V , people are more likely to get vaccinated
when the selection intensity is strong.
When the selection intensity β is quite strong, both tanh β(V )2 and tanh
β(C−V )
2
approach 1 based on Eq. (8). In this case, the vaccination level x∗ approaches
1− 1
R0
(
1 +
kV UI
kV UH
)
. (10)
On the one hand, it implies that the final vaccination level is independent of
neither C nor V (see Fig. (5)). This mirrors the reality: Under strong selec-
tion, the infected individual will imitate vaccinated individual with probability
approaching 1. Similarly, the vaccinated individual will imitate the infected
individual with probability approaching 0. So the vaccination level is no longer
affected by C or V , provided the selection intensity β is strong. The final vacci-
nation level is sensitive to the ratio C/V , only if the selection intensity β is weak.
On the other hand, the final vaccination level is determined by both the basic
reproductive ratio R0 and the link breaking probability ratio between V − UI
and V − UH. The larger the basic reproductive ratio R0 is, the higher the
final vaccination level reaches, which is consistent with previous works [8, 21].
The ratio between kV UI and kV UH mirrors the social bias in the population.
When the ratio is one. no social bias is present, as if in a well-mixed popula-
tion. And the final vaccination level 1− 2R0 degenerates to that in a well mixed
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population. If the ratio kV UIkV UH is smaller, i.e., vaccinated individuals are likely to
connect with the infected unvaccinators. The final vaccination level increases.
This is because, infected individuals are isolated from the other unvaccinated
via the vaccinated individual. It results in a population configuration, where
unsuccessful free-riders are more likely to connect with vaccinators. Consider-
ing the population structure is for social imitation, unsuccessful free-riders are
likely to imitate other vaccinators than in a well mixed population. Therefore,
the vaccination level increases. In fact the final vaccination level in a dynamical
network under strong selection, i.e., Eq. (10) implies that social bias can be
interpreted as a reproductive ratio rescaling in a well-mixed population. The
larger the ratio kV UIkV UH on a dynamical network is, i.e., the greater social bias is,
the smaller the effective basic reproductive ratio in the well mixed population is.
This results in a low vaccination level. Following the same argument, we have
that the vaccination level increases, if the ratio kV UIkV UH is small. Furthermore,
the maximum vaccination level here is given by 1− 1R0 , which is obtained when
the vaccinator-infected-unvaccinated ties are much more close than vaccinator-
healthy-unvaccinated ones. Noteworthy, this vaccination level is higher than
that in the well-mixed population, given by 1− 2R0 . thus the social bias in imi-
tation would drive the population away from the Nash equilibrium to the social
optimum vaccination level.
4. Agent-based simulation
In this section, we perform an agent-based simulation to validate theoretical
analysis. Simulation procedures are as follows.
1. Initially, N individuals are situated on the vertices of a network. Each
individual has exactly k neighbors. Randomly, Nx individuals choose to
take vaccination, while others not, where x ∈ [0, 1] is initial vaccination
level. Thus yields infection probability f(x) for unvaccinated individuals.
That is to say, N(1 − x)f(x) unvaccinated individuals get infected at
random.
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2. In each generation, we generate a random real number r ∈ (0, 1). If r > ω,
we perform one strategy update accompanying an epidemic season(Go to
step. (3)). Otherwise, we execute social relationship adjustment(Go to
step. (4)).
3. If a strategy update occurs, then a link is selected at random whose ending
nodes are namely Alice and Bob. Alice or Bob is selected randomly to
update his or her strategy. Without loss of generality let us assume that
Bob is to update his strategy. His payoff and Alice’s are denoted by pBob
and pAlice respectively. With probability
1
1 + exp[−β(pAlice − pBob)] ,
Bob takes Alice’s strategy. Otherwise, Bob keeps his strategy. Then there
comes a new epidemic season. As vaccination level x alters in the pro-
cess of strategy update, we have a new infection rate f(x). Similarly,
N(1− x)f(x) unvaccinated individuals get infected randomly. It is note-
worthy that all the previous infected individuals recovered at the end of
last epidemic season. Hence infected individuals in current epidemic sea-
son are independent of previous ones.
Go back to step. (2).
4. If a social relationship adjustment occurs, then a link is selected at random.
The two nodes at the two extremes of the selected link take strategies i and
j respectively. With probability kij , the link breaks. If the link breaks,
then i or j is entitled to establish a new link with anyone who is not
his or her current neighbors. Otherwise, the link remains connected. If
the operations above result in any isolated space(no neighbors), then we
countermand all the operations and perform social relationship adjustment
again.
Go back to Step. (2).
In Fig. (4)(5), there is a deviation between theoretical and simulated values,
which is due to the stochasticity in link rewiring. The vaccination level is pre-
dicted by deterministic equations. We assume that when strategy updates, the
16
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Figure 4: The vaccination level as a function of kV UI
kV UH
. The line indicates numerical
solutions based on Eq. (8). As kV UI increases or kV UH decreases, i.e.,
kV UI
kV UH
goes up, the
vaccination level goes down. The points represent the agent-based simulation which agree
with the numerical simulation. Each data point is the average of 30 independent runs with
initial vaccination level of 50%. And in each run, the final vaccination level is estimated
with the largest sojourn time over 107 generations. The final vaccination level is theoretically
captured by the stable equilibrium of the differential equation Eq. ((6)). In addition, β =
10, 1−ω = 0.001, kV V = kUHUH = kUIUI = kUHUI = 0.5, N = 100, k = 4 for all data points
and curve above.
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Figure 5: The vaccination level as a function of rationality characterized by selec-
tion intensity β. The curves indicate numerical solutions based on Eq. 8. When C < 2V ,
the vaccination level goes up as β increases. On the contrary when C > 2V , the fraction
of vaccination goes down as β increases. The above two cases tend to agree each other as
long as β large enough. That is to say, when β is too large, the relation between C and
2V has no influence on the vaccination level. The points represent the agent-based simu-
lation which basically agree with the numerical simulation. Each data point is the average
of 30 independent runs with initial vaccination level of 50%. And in each run, we set the
state with largest sojourn time over 107 generations as the equilibrium state. In addition,
1−ω = 0.001, kV V = kUHUH = kUIUI = kUHUI = 0.5, kV UI = kV UH = 0.8, N = 100, k = 4
for all the curves and data points above.
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adjustment of social relationships has already reached a steady state. However,
in the simulation, the strategy can update when link rewiring have not reached
the steady state.
5. Conclusion and discussion
Preemptive vaccination has been the principal strategy to control influenza
[1, 2]. Vaccination is similar to multi-player snowdrift game: non-vaccinators
try to exploit the herd immunity created by the vaccinators, whereas vaccinators
pay costs to get the immunity. Those who do not shovel in the snow drift would
benefit from those who shovel, whereas those who shovel pay costs themselves
to go home. Here, vaccination can be seen an altruism behavior, because non-
vaccinators benefit from herd immunity which is contributed by vaccinators
[5, 40, 41]. Individuals in vaccination dilemma always tend to do what others
do not do, as individuals in snow drift game do. However, they are not the
same: in snowdrift game, if individuals choose to defect, they will definitely
benefit, provided there are enough cooperators [21]. In other words, as long
as the minimum number of people required to clear snow is exceeded, those
who do not shovel will go home paying nothing. For vaccination, however,
unvaccinated individuals can still be infected, even if there is herd immunity.
The risk of being infected is a double-sword in the vaccination dilemma. One
the one hand, unsuccessful free riders, i.e., the infected non-vaccinators gain
less than the vaccinated, and it gives rise to an increase in vaccination level;
On the other hand, vaccinators gain less than successful free riders, i.e., healthy
unvaccinated individuals, and it yields that vaccination level would decrease.
It is an arm race between these two tendency in a dilemma of vaccination via
imitation.
Here, we take into account of the dynamical nature of the social network on
which imitation takes place. In contrast with previous works [8, 4, 20, 42, 29, 43],
we combine three dynamics together: i) epidemics dynamics ii) linking dynam-
ics, and iii) imitation dynamics. The three dynamics feedback with each other
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to adjust the vaccination level: When disease breaks out, the probability of an
unvaccinated individual getting infected is determined by the vaccination level.
When the disease is over, individuals adjust their ties via social bias or pref-
erential attachment [24]. The resulting network configuration determines ’who
imitates whom’, which is crucial for imitation dynamics. For example, infected
non-vaccinators are more likely to be excluded than others. They adjust their
social relationships and update strategies to get potential herd immunity. It is
found that it is helpful to inhibit the outbreak of disease, when the symmetry
between epidemic and information transmission network breaks [20]. Therefore,
it is often that epidemic spreading and vaccination campaign are assumed to
occur in two different networks as in [21, 22]. We inherit this assumption. In
particular, we notice that non-vaccinators are likely to be infected by anyone
who has contacts with them. But during vaccination campaign, they only im-
itate their neighbors’ strategies via the social network. Therefore we assume
that the epidemic spreads in a well mixed population [31, 32] and the vaccine
campaign evolves on a stochastic network, which is more practical. What’s
more, we assume that the SIR model has already reached a steady state when
vaccination campaign takes place. For vaccination campaign, we assume that
strategy updates happen rarely compared to social relationship adjustments.
Whether or not to vaccinate can be seen as whether or not to cooperate
with others. We describe the social relationship adjustments through linking
dynamics, which is often used to study the relationship between cooperators and
defectors [25, 26, 27, 44, 28]. For strategy updates, imitation process typically
assumes that an individual is selected randomly and then choose a neighbor
around the selected individual randomly to imitate the its strategy [8, 25, 4,
20, 31, 42]. Noteworthy, we describe strategy updates in terms of selecting a
link first and then choosing an individual between two nodes at the extremes
of the link randomly to imitate the other one. This method results in a simple
deterministic equation Eq. (4), which is the key for theoretical analysis.
We find that after disease spreading, reducing the interaction between vacci-
nated individuals and hitchhiking individuals, or increasing interaction between
20
vaccinated individuals and infected individuals, are helpful to control the dis-
ease. Intuitively, reducing the interaction between vaccinated individuals and
successful hitchhiking individuals decreases the chance that these two types indi-
viduals meet. Thus vaccinators are less likely to meet the successful free-riders,
who is better off than vaccinators. Further, It results in a low probability
a vaccinator taking no vaccination next year. Thus it promotes vaccination.
Similarly, increasing interaction between vaccinated individuals and infected in-
dividuals yields a network configuration where infected non-vaccinators meet
more often the vaccinators. In this case, vaccinators are better off than infected
non-vaccinators. Thus non-vaccinators are more likely to take vaccination via
imitation next year. In fact, there are two kinds of defectors in the vaccination
dilemma, the lucky ones (healthy) and the unlucky ones (infected). Thus there
are two kinds of cooperator-defector links. Our results show that the fragility of
the two kinds of cooperator-defector play the opposite role in promoting vacci-
nation level. This arm race arises from the double-sword effect mentioned in the
first paragraph in the discussion. Furthermore, it is not valid any more that the
more fragile the relationships between cooperators and defectors are, the higher
cooperation level is achieved [26], which is a well-known result in cooperation
on dynamical networks.
In addition, we study how the vaccination level alters as a function of se-
lection intensity (or rationality), which is typically challenging in evolutionary
game theory [8, 4, 30]. We make use of the deterministic replicator equation
to overcome this obstacle. We find that the relative cost, i.e., the medical cost
over the vaccine cost, plays a key role: When the relative cost is beyond 2, the
weaker the selection intensity is, the more individuals take vaccination to avoid
the expensive medical cost and improve the herd immunity at the same time.
When the relative cost is below 2, the weaker the selection intensity is, the fewer
individuals take vaccination. This does not go along with previous results that
weak selection promotes the spread of altruism and strong selection impedes al-
truism [39]. When the selection intensity is sufficiently strong, the relative cost
hardly affects the vaccination level. This is because people are oversensitive to
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the payoff gap. A small payoff gap will make them imitate others’ strategies
with probability approaching 1. And in particular under strong selection, we
find that the vaccination dilemma on an evolving network mirrors the vaccina-
tion dilemma in the well-mixed population with a rescaled basic reproductive
ratio. It indicates that proper social bias in imitation could be equivalent with
reducing the basic reproductive ratio. It implies the social reconnection or ad-
justment, even when the epidemics season is over, can still play a key role in
vaccination taking behavior. Yet noteworthy, the social bias here exists in the
vaccination campaign rather than in the epidemic season. It has nothing to do
with the isolation in the epidemic season.
Let us further consider that robustness of the results under different ways
of payoff collection. For instance, the opponents’ payoff can be calculated as
the average payoff who take the same strategy as his opponents [16, 30]. We
find that strategy update rules are equivalent to strengthen or dilute selection
intensity. For example, in [16], they compared two strategy update rules. One
is an original rule via which an individual just compares his payoff with the
payoff of a randomly selected neighbor. The other considers a new rule where
an individual compares his payoff with the average payoff who take the same
strategy as his opponent. We find the new rule mirrors diluting the selection
intensity, compared to the original rule (see Appendix D). In other words, we
could rescale selection intensity to investigate this issue based on Section 3.3.2.
To sum up, we incorporate the dynamical nature of social network into
vaccination. And we find that it enhances the vaccination level, if infected
non-vaccinated individuals meet more often the vaccinators, or if the healthy
non-vaccinators interact less often with the vaccinators. Furthermore, we find
that the dynamical nature of social network would be equivalent with rescaling
basic reproductive ratio.
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Appendix A. Infection probability of the unvaccinated
We adopt SIR model to capture dynamics of epidemic spreading [3]. There
are three types of individuals: susceptible individuals (S), infected individuals
(I), recovered individuals (R). The dynamics of the SIR is given by
dS
dt
= µ (1− x)− αSI − µS, (A.1)
dI
dt
= αSI − γI − µI, (A.2)
dR
dt
= µx+ γI − µR, (A.3)
Here, µ is the birth and death rate. Since we assume the population is constant
in size, α is the mean transmission rate, γ is the mean recovery rate, x is the
vaccination level. R0 is the basic reproductive ratio. From the Eq. (A.2),
we get R0 = α/(γ + µ). If R0 ≤ 1 and dI/dt is negative, the disease cannot
persist. When the the proportion of the population (S, I,R) is stable, we get
S∗ = 1/R0, I∗ = µ[R0(1 − x) − 1]/α,R∗ = 1 − I∗ − S∗. By setting I∗ > 0, we
find the disease cannot be eradicated, when the vaccination level x < 1− 1/R0.
When the vaccination level x ≥ 1 − 1/R0, people will benefit from the herd
immunity and the disease will be eradicated. So when x ≥ 1− 1/R0, f(x) = 0,
i.e., the disease will be eradicated.
The probability for each unvaccinated individual, when the vaccination up-
take level is x, being infected is denoted by f(x). The death rate is µ and
the infection rate is αI∗ of an unvaccinated individual. In addition, the death
and infection are two independent Poisson processes, hence f(x) is denoted by
αI∗/(αI∗ + µ). We arrive at
f(x) =
1−
1
R0(1−x) if 0 ≤ x < 1− 1R0
0 if x ≥ 1− 1R0
. (A.4)
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Appendix B. The stationary regime of the dynamical network
Every individual has three strategies to choose from {V,UH,UI}, hence
there are six types of links ij (ij ∈ {V V,UHUH,UIUI, V UH, V UI, UHUI}).
Each link is broken with probability kij (i.e., probability of link breaking between
individual taking strategy i and individual taking strategy j). We select a link
named m. If the link does not break, mt+1 = mt. If the link breaks, a new
link is introduced. The new link is only related to mt. [To Prof. Wu, what we
wanna say is Markov Property, once mt is known, mt+1 is independent of mt0
where t0 < t] In other words, the status of next moment is only determined by
the former moment, which is the property of Markov. A Markov Chain with the
transition matrix V(AB)(CD) can be constructed to capture the link dynamics.
The V(AB)(CD) indicates the transition probability that a AB link turns to a
CD link in one time step. Therefore the conditional transition matrix V is given
by

V V UHUH UIUI V UH V UI UHUI
V V 1 − kV V (1 − xV ) 0 0 kV V xUH kV V xUI 0
UHUH 0 1 − kUHUH (1 − xUH ) 0 kUHUHxV 0 kUHUHxUI
UIUI 0 0 1 − kUIUI (1 − xUI ) 0 kUIUIxV kUIUIxUH
V UH
kV UHxV
2
kV UHxUH
2
0 1 − kV UH (1+xUI )
2
kV UHxUI
2
kV UHxUI
2
V UI
kV UIxV
2
0
kV UIxUI
2
kV UIxUH
2
1 − kV UI (1+xUH )
2
kV UIxUH
2
UHUI 0
kUHUIxUH
2
kUHUIxUI
2
kUHUIxV
2
kUHUIxV
2
1 − kUHUI (1+xV )
2

(B.1)
.
Note that the Markov chain is aperiodic and irreducible, when xV xUHxUI
∏
ij kij 6=
0. Hence, there exists a unique stationary distribution pi = (piV V , piUHUH , piUIUI , piV UH , piV UI , piUHUI).
The stationary distribution pi is determined by the equation piV = pi [25]. We
find that
piij =
a(x)(2− δij)xixj
kij
, (B.2)
where δij indicates the Kronecker Delta. Here a(x) is the normalization factor,
where x = (xV , xUI , xUH), is given by a(x) = [(x
2
V /kV V ) + (x
2
UH/kUHUH) +
(x2UI/kUIUI) + (2xV xUH/kV UH) + (2xV xUI/kV UI) + (2xUHxUI/kUHUI)]
−1.
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Appendix C. Vaccination level as a function of the selection intensity
In the section 3.3.2, we have get the derivative of the equilibrium as a func-
tion of the selection intensity ∂x
∗
∂β .
We set
H(β) =
V
2
sech 2
(
V
2
β
)
tanh
(
C − V
2
β
)
− C − V
2
tanh
(
V
2
β
)
sech 2
(
C − V
2
β
)
, (C.1)
then we get
∂x∗
∂β
= − kV UI
kV UH
1
R0
H(β)
tanh2
(
C−V
2 β
) . (C.2)
The derivative of H(β) as a function of selection intensity β is
∂H(β)
∂β
= 2
((
C − V
2
)
2sech 2
(
C − V
2
β
)
−
(
V
2
)
2sech 2
(
V
2
β
))
tanh
(
C − V
2
β
)
tanh
(
V
2
β
)
.
(C.3)
Let’s denote
T (β) =
C − V
2
sech
(
C − V
2
β
)
− V
2
sech
(
V
2
β
)
. (C.4)
We have that
∂H(β)
∂β
= 2T (β)
((
C − V
2
)
sech
(
C − V
2
β
)
+
(
V
2
)
sech
(
V
2
β
))
tanh
(
C − V
2
β
)
tanh
(
V
2
β
)
.
(C.5)
In order to investigate the sign of T (β), let’s first analyze the relationship
between C−VV and
sech(V2 β)
sech(C−V2 β)
.
∂
sech(V2 β)
sech(C−V2 β)
∂β
=
(
C−V
2 tanh
(
C−V
2 β
)− V2 tanh (V2 β)) sech (V2 β)
sech
(
C−V
2 β
) . (C.6)
If C−V2 >
V
2 > 0, i.e.,
C−V
V > 1, we obtain that limβ→+∞
sech(V2 β)
sech(C−V2 β)
=
lim
β→+∞
exp(C−V2 β)
exp(V2 β)
= +∞ > C−VV and
∂
sech(V2 β)
sech(C−V2 β)
∂β > 0. This implies that
sech(V2 β)
sech(C−V2 β)
is an increasing function of β. On the other hand, lim
β→0
sech(V2 β)
sech(C−V2 β)
=
1 < C−VV , so there exists β
∗ > 0 which makes
(
C−V
2
)
sech
(
C−V
2 β
∗)−(V2 ) sech (V2 β∗) =
0. In addition, C−VV −
sech(V2 β)
sech(C−V2 β)
is positive in (0, β∗] and negative in (β∗,∞),
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i.e., T (β) is positive in (0, β∗] and negative in (β∗,∞). Following the same ar-
gument, we obtain that, if V2 >
C−V
2 > 0, i.e.,
C
V < 2, T (β) is negative in (0, β
∗]
and positive in (β∗,∞).
If C−V2 >
V
2 > 0, i.e.,
C
V > 2, According to Eq. (C.5), the derivative of H(β)
is positive in (0, β∗] and negative in (β∗,∞). The H(β) is alway positive, since
lim
β→0
H(β) = 0 and lim
β→∞
H(β) = 0. Therefore, when the ratio of C to V exceeds
2, dx
∗
dβ is always negative. Hence, x
∗ is a decreasing function of β.
Similarly, if V2 >
C−V
2 > 0, i.e.,
C
V < 2, the derivative of H(β) as a function
of selection intensity is negative in (0, β∗] and positive in (β∗,∞). Since the
lim
β→0
H(β) = 0 and lim
β→∞
H(β) = 0, the H(β) is alway negative. So when the
ratio of C to V is below 2, the derivative of the equilibrium, i.e., dx
∗
dβ , is always
positive. Hence, x∗ is an increasing function of β.
Appendix D. Alternative strategy update rule as selection intensity
rescaling
We take [16] as an example to show that strategy updating rule sometimes
can be mapped to the Fermi rule with a rescaled selection intensity. This result
is fundamental to check the robustness of evolutionary rules on the final vacci-
nation level. Once the rescaling is made, we make use of Section 3.3.2 to reveal
how different updating rules alter the final vaccination level.
Usually, individual updates its strategy just by comparing its payoff with
the payoff of a randomly selected neighbor, which is defined as the original rule.
In [16], it raised a new rule where an individual compares its payoff with the
average payoff who take the same strategy as its opponent.
To simplify the following analysis, we define
G [β(fj − fi)] = 1
1 + exp [−β (fj − fi)] . (D.1)
For the original rule, the dynamics of the vaccination level can be captured
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by
x˙1 =x1(1− x1)w(x1) (G [β(fV − fUI)]−G [β(fUI − fV )]) +
x1(1− x1)(1− w(x1)) (G [β(fV − fUH)]−G [β(fUH − fV )]) .
(D.2)
For the new rule, the dynamics of the vaccination level can be captured by
x˙2 = x2(1− x2) (G [β(fV − fU )]−G [β(fU − fV )]) , (D.3)
where fU = fUIw(x2)+fUH(1−w(x2)) = (−1)w(x2)+0(1−w(x2)) = −w(x2).
In order to study the effect of selection intensity, we define x˙1 = Φ1(β)
x˙2 = Φ2(β) and perform the Taylor expansion of Eq. (D.2) (D.3) in the vicinity
of β = 0.
Φ(β) = Φ(0) + Φ′(0)β +
Φ′′(0)β2
2
+
Φ′′′(0)β3
6
+ o(β3). (D.4)
For the original rule,
Φ1(0) = 0
Φ′1(0) = 2x1(1 − x1)G′(0)(w(x1)(fV − fUI) + (1 − w(x1))(fV − fUH)) =
2x1(1− x1)G′(0)(w(x1) + fV )
Φ′′1(0) = 0
Φ′′′1 (0) = 2x1(1− x1)G′′′(0)
(
w(x1)(fV − fUH)3 + (1− w(x1))(fV − fUH)3
)
For the new rule,
Φ2(0) = 0
Φ′2(0) = 2x2(1− x2)G′(0)(fV − fU ) = 2x2(1− x2)G′(0)(fV + w(x2))
Φ′′2(0) = 0
Φ′′′2 (0) = 2x2(1−x2)G′′′(0)(fV−fU )3 = 2x2(1−x2)G′′′(0) (w(x2)(fV − fUI) + (1− w(x2))(fV − fUH))3
It is obvious that Φ1(0) = Φ2(0), Φ
′
1(0) = Φ
′
2(0), Φ
′′
1(0) = Φ
′′
2(0). Because
(x3)′′ = 6x, g(x) = x3 is a concave function when x > 0. For λ ∈ (0, 1), we have
g(λx1+(1−λ)x2) ≤ λg(x1)+(1−λ)g(x2). Hence, (w(x)(fV − fUI) + (1− w(x))(fV − fUH))3 ≤
w(x)(fV − fUH)3 + (1− w(x))(fV − fUH)3, i.e., Φ′′′2 (0) ≤ Φ′′′1 (0).
So Φ2(β) ≤ Φ1(β), i.e., the new rule mirrors diluting the selection intensity.
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